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The purpose of this paper is to examine 
Kuwaiti industrial development and, in 
particular, several Dutch disease fac-
tors - the impact of the movements in 
the real exchange rate and the relative 
rates of sectoral inflation on the coun-
try's pattern of development. The Dutch 
disease was found to be particularly 
strong in the years immediately prior to 
the oil price declines in 1982. However, 
even before the 1990 invasion of 
Kuwait, and based on oil market fore-
casts at the time, analysis suggests 
that devaluation of the country's cur-
rency would not necessarily have re-
sulted in a major expansion of indust-
rial output. 
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Diversification in a 
small oil exporting 
economy 
The impact of the Dutch disease on 
Kuwait's industrialization 
Robert E. Looney 
The potential difficulties involved in relying on primary exports for a 
farge fraction of foreign exchange earnings have long been a preoccupa-
tion of development economists. The focus of this work, however, has 
been on export price and revenue instability, declining terms of trade 
and balance of payments crisis resulting from the collapse of primary 
export markets. Little attention has been paid to problems associated 
with export booms. Obviously this is partly due to the fact that such 
booms are in fact beneficial. They relax the foreign exchange constraint 
on growth in countries often facing continual balance of payments 
deficits and are accompanied by expansion of domestic production and 
incomes. 1 
Recent literature2 on primary producing developing countries in-
creasingly stresses the fact that an export boom can be a mixed blessing. 
While the increase in national income and improvement in the balance 
of payments are welcomed, some sectors can be adversely affected as 
both Qutput and factor incomes fall. When these sectors consist of 
manufactured goods deindustrialization occurs. Because of the possibil-
ity of such an outcome, such export windfalls have been stigmatized as 
the Dutch disease. This term derives from the difficulties experienced 
by the Dutch manufacturing sector as a result of the natural gas 
discoveries of the 1960s. The export boom caused a real appreciation of 
the guilder (above the level at which it would otherwise have been), 
reducing the competitiveness of Dutch industry relative to the rest of the 
world. 
As Al-Sabah notes3 the Dutch disease is not unique to oil or gas 
exporting countries, but has occurred in a variety of environments: 
1. The natural gas discoveries in the Netherlands in the 1960s led to an 
appreciation in the real exchange rate, brought about not so much by an 
appreciation in the nominal exchange rate as by nominal wage increases ahead 
of those of West Germany, with the net result that her export industries were 
squeezed and a decline in Dutch manufacturing set in. 
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2. The boom in technologically advanced parts of Japan's manufacturing sector 
in the 1960s had adverse effects on the less dynamic tradable sectors, including 
agriculture. 
3. The boom in the export of Swiss bonds and money in the 1970s led to a real 
appreci\ltion in the Swiss franc and had an adverse effect on traditional Swiss 
exports and export competing industries. 
In all of these cases there was an erosion of the existing productive 
sectors (particularly agriculture and manufacturing) as a result of a 
general cost increase caused by a salary and wage pull from the oil and 
government sectors and a lack of competitiveness against imports and in 
export markets, due to the strengthening of the local exchange rate in 
response to the resource based trade surplus. 
However, in testing the applicability of the Dutch disease theory to 
the Arabian Gulf economies, Stevens4 notes that these countries may 
not experience the classic problems associated with a booming sector 
because these countries actually·had little by way of directly productive 
activities before the discovery of oil and hence there was little to be 
damaged. 
It is not inevitable, therefore, that Kuwaiti manufacturing industries 
experience net negative effects from the post 1973-74 oil boom. Given 
their low initial level of industrialization and the lack of an indigenoys 
capital goods sector, an appreciating currency could provide a net 
subsidy rather than a cost to indigenous manufacturers; by reducing the 
cost of imported capital and intermediate goods. 
This effect may be particularly relevant to Kuwait where one of the 
main inputs to industrial production, workers, is largely foreign, and 
therefore essentially imported. The same applies to other tradable 
sectors. A priori, therefore, it is impossible to draw any conclusions as 
to whether the Dutch disease has been a major obstacle to the 
development of manufacturing in Kuwait. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine Kuwaiti industrial develop-
ment and, in particular, several Dutch disease factors - the impact of the 
movements in the real exchange rate5 and the relative rates of sectoral 
inflation on the country's pattern of development. Based on the results 
of this analysis, several conclusions are drawn concerning the country's 
economic diversification policies. 
Impact of government expenditures on industrial 
diversification 
Government expenditures in Kuwait, particularly direct investment in 
productive capacity, have obviously played a large and direct role in the 
country's industrial expansion. On the other hand some of the side 
effects associated with this expenditure may have created an environ-
ment where the private sector experiences increased difficulties in 
competing on a profitable basis with foreign producers. 
Specifically, government expenditures in oil based economies have 
the potential to set off a chain of price effects, whereby the profitability 
of internationally traded goods falls relative to non-traded goods - the 
so called Dutch disease effect. In a Dutch disease environment pet-
roleum financed public seCtor expenditures result in expanded imports, 
and there is a decline in the relative price of traded goods. These 
patterns occur due to excess demand increasing the price of non-traded 
goods (mostly construction and services). 
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Since firms producing non-traded goods by definition do not have to 
face international competition they have the potential to maintain or-
even increase their profitability by passing on cost increases in the form 
of higher domestic prices for their products. Firms producing traded 
goods, on the other hand, do not have this option because they have to 
meet foreign competition. Government assistance in the form of 
important restrictions could alleviate this situation. However, in Kuwait 
the government has for philosophical reasons in large part adapted a 
free market approach to direct government intervention. 
Whether or not the profitability of traded goods has fallen significant-
ly in the country is, of course, ultimately an empirical matter. If this 
situation has developed potentially dynamic industries such as manufac-
turing will not be in a position to b~ the leading sector which many of the 
country's development plans envisage. Put differently, the expansion in 
employment and output in manufacturing industry in the post 1973-74 
era has been suppressed below normal levels. ~ 
· Previous studies have found some evidence of the presence of the 
Dutch disease in the region. 6 The orientation of these studies was 
largely theoretical, however, with few if any policy ramifications 
considered. To overcome this limitation, the following sections examine. 
the recent evolution of the Kuwaiti economy. Particular attention will 
be focused on identifying the existence of Dutch disease and to what • 
extent the problems associated with it can be overcome through public 
policy. 
Kuwait: patterns of economic expansion 
The industrial evolution of Kuwait has occurred in three discernible 
stages. 7 The first was the establishment of a wide range of construction 
materials industries in response to the government's plan to use its vast 
oil revenues to expand and improve the country's infrastructure. The 
second was concentrated in consumer oriented industries in response to 
the sharp increase in the demand for consumer goods, which resulted 
from the substantial influx of immigrant workers required to build the 
country's infrastructure. The third stage was represented by down-
stream hydrocarbon industries such as petroleum refining, fertilizers, 
petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals. The surge in these industries was 
effected by the government's attempt to harness the economy's compa-
rative advantage in order to diversify the industrial sector, to reduce the 
country's dependence on crude oil exports, and to broaden the income 
base of the country. 
The present industrial sector in Kuwait can be segmented into four 
identifiable types of industrial activity:8 
1. Industries with abundant local materials: this group of industries 
obtains its cost advantage primarily from the availability of basic 
raw materials at home. Based on the abundance of natural gas and 
oil, where the latter can be used as a source of energy as well as 
feedstock, a host of refined petroleum products and petrochemi-
cals can be produced at home for export. Some progress has 
already been achieved in the area of refined products and much 
can still be accomplished in intermediate and final petrochemicals. 
Similarly there are other industries whose major inputs are 
available at home, such as foam glass from solid waste, reclaimed 
rubber from discarded tyres, oil lubricants from discarded auto-
33 
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mobile oil, leather from animal waste etc. These activities possess 
a clear cut comparative cost advantage. .., 
2. Industries with natural trade protection: the basic assumption here 
is that the shipping cost of certain products from other countries 
may be sufficiently high to render local production economically 
competitive eg cement, asbestos pipes, bricks and aggregates. This 
assumption readily explains the second ranking already achieved 
by the construction materials industry in the Kuwaiti economy. 
Industries producing non-traded goods, such as desalinated water, 
have also flourished and expanded in response to population and 
commercial expansion. 
3. Strategic industries: these industries do not necessarily belong to 
the two categories mentiqned above. Whether or not they exhibit 
comparative advantage and/or are naturally protected from for-
eign competition they were established to give the nation a 
measure of economic independence despite reliance on govern-
ment subsidies. Processed food products, soft drinks, milk, bread 
and pharmaceuticals fall into this category. 
4. Industries with comparative cost advantage: based on the optimal 
economic size and sufficiency of the domestic demand, many 
industries are competitive as a result of Kuwait's factor endow-
ments vis-a-vis its trading partners. The basic premise here is th0at 
the structure of Kuwait's factor prices relative tg other countries 
would, in certain industries according to the relative cost of each 
input to a unit of output, make it advantageous to produce the 
product at home instead of importing it. Examples that already 
exist in Kuwait include assembling central air conditioning units, 
printing, stationery, packaging materials, apparel and automobile 
batteries. 
The industrial sector in Kuwait currently accounts for around 9% of 
GDP. Much of this output is concentrated in the state owned refineries, 
petrochemical installations and in power and desalination plants, 
although the light manufacturing sector makes a more significant 
contribution to employment. 
The rather small share that manufacturing industry contributes to 
Kuwait's non-oil GDP is attributable to both the small size of the 
country's population and to the fact that the government has stood back 
from further local downstream industrialization of the oil and gas sector 
in recent years. The rather slow growth of Kuwaiti manufacturing 
(Taf>le 1) is often attributed to small domestic markets. However, 
Al-Sabah's analysis,9 while only covering the 1970s, points to more 
fundamental Dutch disease related causes: the slow down of manufac-
turing in the 1980s may simply be symptomatic of the residual effects of 
the pre-1982 oil boom. 
Along these lines it should be noted that while there are notable 
exceptions, many manufacturing firms grew faster in the pre-1975 years 
than in later periods. The reverse appears to be the case for many of the 
service oriented sectors. Again these patterns suggest that the simple 
Dutch disease explanation of growth in Kuwait does have validity. The 
patterns of sectoral growth are so varied, however, that additional 
factors need to be incorporated before a complete assessment of the 
factors responsible for the observed patterns of growth over the last 
decade and a half can be made. 
The sectoral growth rates also indicate a considerable dichotomy 
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Table 1. Kuwait: sectoral growth, 1977-86 (constant 1984 prices, million Kuwaiti dinars). 
Source: Computed from data in State of Kuwait, 
Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, 
Annual Statistical Abstract, 1987, pp 268--269. 
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Growth 
Sector 1970--S6 1970--74 1977-86 1982-86 
Agriculture and fishing 
Agriculture · 12.4 10.6 27.8 27.3 
Fishing -4.6 3.4 -4.2 -7.3 
Mining and quarrying -1.3 33.49 -19.1 -13.1 
Manufacturing 
Food, beverages and tobacco 4.5 3.5 7.2 7.9 
Textiles and apparel 3.9 31.2 3.0 -1.4 
Wood and wood products 5.1 9.2 -6.1 -6.2 
Paper, printing and publishing 8.1 12.7 0.6 -3.2 
Petroleum refining 1.5 -2.1 5.9 8.8 
Chemicals 6.3 43.3 -1.7 0.6 
Non-metallic minerals 7.'2 17.7 -0.4 -5.0 
Basic metals 4.1 29.0 -15.2 -21.6 
Fabricated metal products 6.6 14.8 3.2 -7.8 
Other manufactures 1.9 0.0 -5.2 0.0 
Construction 3.1 7.5 -4.9 -14.0 
Private services 
Wholesale and retail trade 3.4 3.4 -0.7 -11.2 
Hotels and restaurants 7.2 0.6 1.2 -10.1 
Transport and storage 4.0 4.1 6.6 -8.7 
Communications 13.2 14.3 18.9 0.8 
Financial institutions 6.0 3.4 8.1 -0.1 
Insurance 4.9 2.3 2.8 -1.1 
Real estate 1.9 2.6 4.0. 9.3 
Personal and household 1.5 6.7 -0.1 -5.2 
Public services 
Public administration and defence 2.5 10.2 3.1 3.4 
Sanitation 5.1 5.3 9.8 4.4 
Education 4.2 8.0 3.5 1.4 
Health 4.2 4.5 5.9 2.4 
Social security and welfare 6.0 7.4 5.0 3.5 
Recreational and cultural 2.7 3.8 2.8 1.8 
between sectors, with those sectors likely to consist largely of non-
traded goods growing faster (especially during the oil boom years of 
1976--81) than sectors likely to be dominated by tradable activities. 
These patterns appear to relate to the underlying Dutch disease 
mechanism of sectoral growth - differential rates of inflation between 
tradables and non-tradables. 
During the period of highest inflation in Kuwait (1974-82), manufac-
turing sectors in general experienced much lower rates of inflation than 
their service sector counterparts. Many of the manufacturing activities 
did not kave rates of inflation appreciably above their long-run average 
(1970-86) over this period. Again with several exceptions the service 
sectors tended to have appreciably higher inflation relative to their 
long-run average during the 1970-82 period (Table 2). 
Mechanisms of economic expansion 
Clearly the output of the various sectors of the Kuwaiti economy will be 
simultaneously affected by a number of factors in addition to those 
related to the appreciation of the real exchange rate. These factors need 
to be controlled for in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the Dutch 
disease impact. It is assumed here that output of each sector is a 




the Dutch disease proper as proxied by the real exchange rate; 
sectoral output as between tradables and non-tradables., as proxied 
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Source: Computed from data in State of Kuwait, 
Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, 
Annual Statistical Abstract, 1987, pp 268--269. 
1
°The expected rate of inflation is esti-
mated by regressing the private sector 
price deflator on its value for the previous 
year. 
Table 2. Kuwait: sectoral inflation 1970-86 (implicit GDP price deflators, 1984=100). 
Value Growth 
Sector 1974 1982 1974-82 1970-86 
Agriculture and fishing 
5.66 Agriculiure 0.631 1.180 8.14 
Fishing 0.329 1.222 17.82 12.65 
Mining and quarrying 0.593 0.952 6.10 5.24 
Manufacturing 
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.603 0.969 6.11 5.78 
Textiles and apparel 0.628 0.996 5.93 6.16 
Wood and wood products 0.634 0.912 4.64 4.87 
Paper, printing and publishing 0.620 0.865 4.25 5.50 
Petroleum refining 0.934 0.629 -4.82 16.59 
Chemicals 0.517 0.890 7.02 6.01 
Non-metallic minerals 0.652 0.997 5.45 5.38 
Basic metals 0.804 0.973 2.41 5.06 
Fabricated metal products 0.648 1.066 6.41 4.09 
Other manufactures 0.592 1.000 6.77 6.40 
Construction 0.554 0.943 6.87 5.91 
Private services 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.581 0.961 6.49 5.71 
Hotels and restaurants 0.337 0.785 11.15 8.35 
Transport and storage 0.573 0.936 6.32 6.08 
Communications 0.980 1.000 0.26 0.41 
Insurance 0.614 0.994 6.20 7.51 
Real estate 0.416 2.349 24.15 6.16· 
Personal and household 0.324 0.863 13.02 8.80 
Public services 
Public administration and defence 0.323 1.012 15.34 9.87 
Sanitation 0.408 0.864 9.83 6.46 
Education 0.360 0.855 11.41 8.98 
Health 0.388 0.965 12.06 8.37 
Social security and welfare 0.306 0.901 14.45 10.98 
Recreational and cultural 0.431 0.814 8.27 9.71 
by the relative rate of sectoral inflation to that of the non-oil 
sectors of the economy as a whole; 
e resource shift factors, as proxied by the expected rate of 
inflation;10 
e government subsidies as proxied by subsidized electricity; and 
e the general expansion in overall demand. 
This last variable is simply included as a control variable ie there may be 
slow downs in sectoral activity not related to the Dutch disease per se, 
but•rather to the general fall in sectoral demand brought on by a decline 
in oil revenues and/or government expenditures. Its expected sign is 
positive. 
The main findings of the regression analysis on sectoral growth (Table 
3) indicate the following: 
• 
11 The full set of regression results are 
available from the author upon request. 
Regressions for each sector were per- e 
formed with a Cochrane-Orcutt iterative 
estimation procedure to correct for serial 
correlation. All variables were in constant 
Primary activities - agriculture, fishing and mining - exhibit mixed 
results with agriculture and mining experiencing weak Dutch 
disease effects and fishing obtaining a positive stimulus from this 
effect. As already noted Kuwait is largely self sufficient in fish and 
in this sense, given transport costs, the sector is effectively 
comprised of non-tradables. 
Manufacturing activities exhibit a fairly consistent pattern. As 
anticipated, this sector, comprised largely of products that are 
tradable, experienced generally negative impacts from an appre-
ciating exchange rate, and an increase in relative prices. 1984 prices. 
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Table 3. Kuwait: factors affecting sectoral growth." 
... 
"( +) = positive impact on sectoral output and 
employment; ( - ) = negative impact on sectoral 
output and employment; (ins) = no or little im-
pact on sectoral output and employment. Those 
sectors receiving a positive stimulus from subsi-
dized electricity were agriculture, food, textiles 
and petroleum refining. 
12Arab Industry Review, Falcon Pub-
lishing, Manama, Bahrain, 1987/88, pp 
107-108. 
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Dutch Relative Expected Economic 
Sector disease inflation inflation expansion 
Agriculture 
Agriculture· ins 
Fishing ·+. ins ins 
Mining ins ins + 
>Stl 
Manufacturing 
Food ins ins + 
Textiles + + 
Wood products ins ins + 
Paper products ins + + 
Petroleum refining ins ins ins 
Chemicals ins ins ins 
Non-metallic minerals ~ ins ins + 
Basic metals ins ins ins 
Fabricated metals ins + + 
Other manufacturing iQS + 
i : 
Construction i!-r ins + + 
Private services 
Trade ins + 
Hotels + + + 
Transport + ins 
Communications + + + ins 
Finance + ins + ins 
Insurance .ins ins ins + 
Real estate + ins ins ins 
Private services + ins ins ins 
Public services 
Public administration ins ins + 
Sanitation + ins + + 
Education + + + 
Health + ins + + 
Social security + ins ins 
Recreation ins + + ins 
• As expected, services consisting largely of non-tradables generally experienced positive Dutch disease effects. 
Other explanations 
While the results of the analysis of movements in real exchange rates 
and relative prices indicated the pervasive presence of the Dutch disease 
in Kuwait, it should be noted that output of most of the traded sectors 
has continued to decline even during the post-1982 period of real 
exchange depreciation. Does this mean that the Dutch disease effects 
produced during the period of an appreciating exchange rate created 
irreversible disincentives to manufacturing and thus the .ability of this 
sector to create jobs? 
Here it should be noted that the slow down in industry in Kuwait since 
1982 may have been due to once and for all factors, albeit ones sufficient 
to offset the stimulating effect of the reverse Dutch disease. In 
particular, a number of disappointments have been attributed to both 
bad management and the depressed trading conditions in Kuwait that 
have followed the Souk al-Manakh crisis and the collapse of the Iraqi 
market. 
The recent slow growth of Kuwaiti industries has also been attributed 
to the fact that: 12 
• Mistakes were committed in the planning stages due to incomplete economic, technical and marketing studies, and this resulted in 
huge industrial losses with the selling price of some commodities 
becoming 40% lower than forecast. 
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e Some studies even failed to determine the production capacity of 
projects. Some studies expected factories to reach maximtnn 
production within a short period and overlooked the link between 
production growth and labour on the one hand and market 
dt;!mand on the other. 
e Some industrial projects did not get sufficient land for their 
activities or failed to obtain official permission. An important 
obstacle has been the almost complete lack of coordination among 
industrial projects, resulting in the establishment of several similar 
industries at the same time. This increased competition and 
created subsequent problems. 
e Some industrial projects in the form of shareholding companies or 
individual projects faced.Jinancing problems. The owners could 
not complete the required capital and depended on bank loans for 
which they paid high interest rates, thus reducing profitability. 
e The Kuwaiti market has a high purchasing power but low sales 
because of the small population. This problem could have been 
overcome by exports to other Gulf markets but lack of coordina-
tion has resulted in duplication of industries. The world economic 
situation in the early 1980s also harmed local industries as the 
recession forced companies to reduce the price of their exports 
while at the same time facing increased volumes of imports •at 
reduced prices. 
Except for the still relatively small size of the domestic market, these 
· factors were to a large extent no longer present even before the Iraqi 
invasion of August 1990. However, as the analysis above indicated, 
most of the traded goods sectors are positively affected by overall 
increases in demand. Given the projected flat demand over the next five 
or so years it is apparent that devaluation of the currency will not 
necessarily result in a major expansion of industrial output. 
Policy implications 
Given that this paper was written before the 2 August 1990 invasion of 
Kuwait, the policy implications that follow are now merely academic. 
However, before the invasion the pervasive disincentive for industrial 
production in Kuwait associated with the Dutch disease had a number of 
implications for both economic policy and the country's overall develop-
meqt strategy. Most of the Dutch disease literature has focused on the 
consequences of a fall in oil revenues. A theoretically symmetrical 
situation applies when there is a decrease in revenues, but in many ways 
the problems are more severe. 
In this situation adjustment to the new revenue position would have 
required a contraction of the non-traded sectors of the economy ie most 
services, both public and private, and construction together with an 
expansion of the traded sectors - manufacturing and perhaps agricul-
ture. Again before the invasion, and given at that time the likelihood of 
flat oil markets into the mid-1990s, the Kuwaiti government had several 
policies at its disposal to mitigate the effects of fluctuating oil revenues. 
These included: 
e an increase in traded production capacity by importing capital and 
labour; 
e a decrease in the holding of foreign assets; 
38 RESOURCES POLICY March 1991 
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13Anil Markandya and Malcolm Pember-
ton, 'Economic policy with fluctuating oil 
revenues', OPEC Review, Spring 1988, 
p 27. 
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e devaluation of the real exchange rate; 
e provision of wage subsidies to the non-traded sectors; -
e the use of fiscal policy (indirect taxes) to adjust the sectoral impact 
of changing revenues; 
e the .development of a fund to compensate (tax) firms for move-
ments in the real exchange rate. 
With regard to the first policy, it was apparent that a large segment of 
Kuwaiti public opinion opposed further expansion in the industrial 
sector through this means. This opposition was based largely on 
non-economic arguments, centring on the threat to the already delicate 
balance that exists among the number of Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis in 
the country. The second and fourth strategies were, of course, always 
possible in the short run but in the longer term are non-viable, even for 
a country as rich as Kuwait. Theoretically, the fifth policy should have 
been effective during periods of increasing revenues where taxes would 
be reduced. While this was somewhat successful in Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait's taxes were so low that the scope for successful application is 
extremely limited. Raising indirect taxes when oil revenues fall was also 
likely to be unsuccessful: 
This policy would lower real wages and increase consumer prices. The room for 
maneuver in changing traded good prices would then be reduced. This would• 
slow the recovery of the traded goods sectors and leave unemplo-yed resources in 
the non-traded goods sector. 13 
While the sixth option was an intriguing possibility, it was not clear how 
to operationalize the payments - how was overvaluation to be measured 
(which price indices) and how was compensation to be made - full? 
partial? 
Before the invasion, therefore, this left devaluation of the real 
exchange rate as the only apparent policy option currently open to 
Kuwaiti authorities for dealing with both the consequences of past 
fluctuations in oil revenues (and probable further declines over the next 
five or so years). In this regard it should be noted that during the period 
of rising oil revenues the Kuwaiti government offset some pressures for 
exchange appreciation by increasing its holdings of foreign assets. Still, 
as the analysis above indicates, increases in the real exchange rate had a 
pervasive effect in retarding growth of nearly all the major non-service 
sectors of the economy. 
Given the likelihood before the invasion of continued static levels of 
oil revenues, reverse movements were required and the exchange rate 
needed to be devalued. This was likely to be much more difficult to 
achieve. The effectiveness of any attempt to significantly correct the 
external imbalance with a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate 
should have depended on a number of factors. As is well known, a 
devaluation raises the prices of imported goods and initially worsens the 
balance of trade in the domestic currency. The effects on the volume of 
exports, imports and domestically produced goods, which act to im-
prove the balance, appear with a long and often irregular lag. Hence, if 
the price effects were to impact more rapidly than the real effects, then 
the policy would be unsuccessful. The pace at which the domestic price 
level changes relative to the·exchange rate is, of course, measured by 
the real exchange rate and that is why this variable is of such import-
ance. For an effective devaluation, this real rate had to be maintained 
for a period of at least three to four years. 
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With regard to the real exchange rate there is evidence that, given its 
economic structure, real devaluations of the currency may have bee"n 
possible in Kuwait. For example, after the first oil shock (1972-75) 
Kuwait managed to keep its rate of inflation even lower than that of the 
USA. This occurred while countries even as stable as Saudi Arabia 
could not contain pressures on non-traded goods (with a resulting price 
increase of 62% greater than the USA). 
Of the leading oil producers, only Kuwait achieved a lower rate of 
inflation than the USA during the period between oil shocks (1975-79). 
Saudi Arabia had a rate of inflation 25% higher than that of the USA 
during this period. Between 1979 and 1982 the US inflation rate was 
33%, while Kuwait's was only 28%. 
Since 1982 oil revenues hav~ been falling in real dollar terms with 
consequent pressure of non-traded goods prices and government re-
venues. While coping with the contraction had proved inflationary in 
some countries, prices rose by only 7% in Kuwait. (In Venezuela, 
Indonesia, Nigeria and Mexico, they rose by 33 % , 41 % , 80% and 427% 
respectively.) By comparison the US inflation rate during that period 
was 11%. 
In terms of the real exchange rate between 1973 and 1977, Kuwait's 
real exchange rate appreciated by 31% (compared to 79% for Saudi 
Arabia). Following the second oil shock (1979-81) Kuwait's exchange 
rate devalued by 8% (relative to 15% for Saudi Arabia-). Between 1981 
and 1985 Kuwait had been able to devalue its real exchange rate by 17% 
. (relative to 20% in Saudi Arabia). Clearly Kuwait's large foreign assets 
have allowed it to control its domestic rate of inflation and facilitated 
the devaluation of its exchange rate. The country's foreign assets have 
also allowed inflationary financing to be avoided. 
In fact, Kuwait had been able to successfully devalue its real exchange 
rate continuously since 1979. Given its large foreign asset position, there 
is no reason this policy could not have been continued in the foreseeable 
future, with ultimately beneficial effects on industrial output. 
Conclusions 
Given the post 1982 fall in the dollar/dinar exchange rate the future 
should have been somewhat brighter for Kuwaiti industry. However, as 
the analysis above indicated, most of the traded goods sectors were 
positively affected by overall increases in demand. Given the pre-
invasion projected decline in demand over the next five or so years it 
was apparent that devaluation of the country's currency would not 
necessarily have resulted in a major expansion of industrial output. It 
should, however, have provided a stimulus to these activities and helped 
the country position itself for the anticipated upswing in oil markets in 
the mid-1990s. 
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Appendix 
Data sources 
The data used in the analysis was for 
the years 197~86. Data on sectoral 
output was taken from State of 
Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Central 
Statistical Office, Annual Statistical 
Abstract, various issues. Economic 
data were from International Monet-
ary Fund, International Financial Sta-
tistics, various issues. 
Estimation procedures 
Equations of the form: 
Sectoral output = f [expenditures, 
credit, real exchange rate, utility 
subsidies, and resource non-
homogeneitylsubstitutability effects] 
were estimated using ordinary least 
squares estimation technique with a 
Cochrane-Orcutt iterative estimation 
procedure to correct for serial correla-
tion in the independent variables. 
Given that the exchange rate is in 
dollars/dinar the expected sign of the 
relative price effect - the Dutch dis-
ease - is expected to be negative for 
sectors where tradables predominate -
agriculture and manufacturing - and 
positive for sectors composed largely 
of non-tradables - construction and 
services. 
The expected sign for the net 
resource, non-homogeneity/ 
substitutability effects - the non-
relative price effects - is less straight-
forward. For lack of a better index we 
assume that these effects are (albeit 
imperfectly) captured by the impact of 
inflation, both expected and unex-
pected, on sectoral profitability. Spe-
cifically, if a sector is largely compris-
ed of tradables, but also contains a 
significant percentage of non-
tradables or goods for which imports 
are poor substitutes, increases in the 
expected and or unexpected rate of 
inflation should increase the profita-
bility of this proportion of sectoral 
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activity after controlling for the Dutch 
disease effects. A positive sign on the 
inflation terms is assumed to indicate 
the predominance of these effects. 
On the other hand a negative sign 
on the inflation term is assumed to be 
indicative of the predominance of the 
resource effect associated with the 
Dutch disease ie the profitability of 
non-tradables in other sectors of the 
economy being sufficiently high to di-
vert resources from the sector under 
consideration. 
For sectors largely comprised of 
·non-tradables we would expect signs 
the reverse of those anticipated for the 
tradable sectors. 
Variables used in analysis 
Sectoral variables 
Agriculture output, constant 1984 
. prices 
Fishing output, constant 1984 prices 
Mining output, constant 1984 prices 
Food, beverages output, constant 
1984 prices 
Textile output, constant 1984 prices 
Wood and wood products output, con-
stant 1984 prices 
Paper and paper products output, con-
stant 1984 prices 
Petroleum refining output, constant 
1984 prices 
Chemicals output, constant 1984 
prices 
Non-metallic minerals output, con-
stant 1984 prices 
Fabricated metal products output, 
constant 1984 prices 
Other manufactures output, constant 
1984 prices 
Construction output, constant 1984 
prices 
Wholesale, retail output, constant 
1984 prices 
Hotel and restraints output, constant 
1984 prices 
Transport and storage output, con-
stant 1984 prices 
-
Communications output, constant 
1984 prices 
Finance output, 1984 prices 
Insurance output, 1984 prices 
Real estate output, constant 1984 
prices 
Utility variables 
Value of subsidized electricity, con-
stant 1984 prices 
Value of subsidized utilities, constant 
1984 prices 
Dutch disease effect 
Exchange rate (dollars/dinar) x GDP 
deflator/import price index 
Inflation effects 
Expected increase m private sector· 
output deflator 
Unexpected increase in private sector 
output deflator 
Expected increase in non-oil output 
deflator 
Unexpected increase in non-oil output 
deflator 
Expected increase in consumer price 
index 
Unexpected increase in consumer 
price index 
Demand effects 
Expected GDP, constant 1984 prices 
Gross domestic product, 1984 prices 
Expected private sector credit, con-
stant 1984 prices 
Private sector credit, constant 1984 
prices 
Expected level of construction, con-
stant 1984 prices 
Unexpected construction, constant 
1984 prices 
Expected non-oil output, constant 
1984 prices 
Unexpected non-oil output, constant 
1984 prices 
Expected government expenditures, 
1984 prices 
Total investment, constant 1984 prices 
Private sector output, constant 1984 
prices 
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